Daily Papers

When fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to align with human values and intentions, maximizing the estimated reward can lead to superior performance, but it also introduces potential risks due to deviations from the reference model's intended behavior. Most existing methods typically introduce KL divergence to constrain deviations between the trained model and the reference model; however, this may not be sufficient in certain applications that require tight risk control. In this paper, we introduce Risk-aware Direct Preference Optimization (Ra-DPO), a novel approach that incorporates risk-awareness by employing a class of nested risk measures. This approach formulates a constrained risk-aware advantage function maximization problem and then converts the Bradley-Terry model into a token-level representation. The objective function maximizes the likelihood of the policy while suppressing the deviation between a trained model and the reference model using a sequential risk ratio, thereby enhancing the model's risk-awareness. Experimental results across three open-source datasets: IMDb Dataset, Anthropic HH Dataset, and AlpacaEval, demonstrate the proposed method's superior performance in balancing alignment performance and model drift. Our code is opensourced at https://github.com/zlj123-max/Ra-DPO.

The rise of AI agents introduces complex safety and security challenges arising from autonomous tool use and environmental interactions. Current guardrail models lack agentic risk awareness and transparency in risk diagnosis. To introduce an agentic guardrail that covers complex and numerous risky behaviors, we first propose a unified three-dimensional taxonomy that orthogonally categorizes agentic risks by their source (where), failure mode (how), and consequence (what). Guided by this structured and hierarchical taxonomy, we introduce a new fine-grained agentic safety benchmark (ATBench) and a Diagnostic Guardrail framework for agent safety and security (AgentDoG). AgentDoG provides fine-grained and contextual monitoring across agent trajectories. More Crucially, AgentDoG can diagnose the root causes of unsafe actions and seemingly safe but unreasonable actions, offering provenance and transparency beyond binary labels to facilitate effective agent alignment. AgentDoG variants are available in three sizes (4B, 7B, and 8B parameters) across Qwen and Llama model families. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that AgentDoG achieves state-of-the-art performance in agentic safety moderation in diverse and complex interactive scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents, their integration into interactive environments and tool use introduce new safety challenges beyond those associated with the models themselves. However, the absence of comprehensive benchmarks for evaluating agent safety presents a significant barrier to effective assessment and further improvement. In this paper, we introduce Agent-SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of LLM agents. Agent-SafetyBench encompasses 349 interaction environments and 2,000 test cases, evaluating 8 categories of safety risks and covering 10 common failure modes frequently encountered in unsafe interactions. Our evaluation of 16 popular LLM agents reveals a concerning result: none of the agents achieves a safety score above 60%. This highlights significant safety challenges in LLM agents and underscores the considerable need for improvement. Through quantitative analysis, we identify critical failure modes and summarize two fundamental safety detects in current LLM agents: lack of robustness and lack of risk awareness. Furthermore, our findings suggest that reliance on defense prompts alone is insufficient to address these safety issues, emphasizing the need for more advanced and robust strategies. We release Agent-SafetyBench at https://github.com/thu-coai/Agent-SafetyBench to facilitate further research and innovation in agent safety evaluation and improvement.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

As awareness of mental health issues grows, online counseling support services are becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide. Detecting whether users express suicidal ideation in text-based counseling services is crucial for identifying and prioritizing at-risk individuals. However, the lack of domain-specific systems to facilitate fine-grained suicide detection and corresponding risk assessment in online counseling poses a significant challenge for automated crisis intervention aimed at suicide prevention. In this paper, we propose PsyGUARD, an automated system for detecting suicide ideation and assessing risk in psychological counseling. To achieve this, we first develop a detailed taxonomy for detecting suicide ideation based on foundational theories. We then curate a large-scale, high-quality dataset called PsySUICIDE for suicide detection. To evaluate the capabilities of automated systems in fine-grained suicide detection, we establish a range of baselines. Subsequently, to assist automated services in providing safe, helpful, and tailored responses for further assessment, we propose to build a suite of risk assessment frameworks. Our study not only provides an insightful analysis of the effectiveness of automated risk assessment systems based on fine-grained suicide detection but also highlights their potential to improve mental health services on online counseling platforms. Code, data, and models are available at https://github.com/qiuhuachuan/PsyGUARD.

In many applications of LLMs, natural language responses often have an underlying structure such as representing discrete labels, numerical values, or graphs. Yet, existing decoding and uncertainty estimation methods operate only in language space and largely disregard structural information. We address this by modeling LLM outputs directly in a task-dependent latent structure. By equipping this structure with a dissimilarity measure, we can compute Bayes-optimal responses. These are not selected from sampled generations but are newly synthesized by combining individual responses in the latent space. Across different tasks, Bayes-optimal responses consistently outperform standard decoding methods like beam search. Moreover, quantifying uncertainty via the induced Bayesian risk captures variations in terms of the latent structure and improves alignment with output quality and correctness. Our decision-theoretic framework is applicable to any problem that admits a latent response structure and enables reliable task-aware LLM predictions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses. These attacks exploit the temporal nature of dialogue to evade single-turn detection methods, representing a critical security vulnerability with significant implications for real-world deployments. This paper introduces the Temporal Context Awareness (TCA) framework, a novel defense mechanism designed to address this challenge by continuously analyzing semantic drift, cross-turn intention consistency and evolving conversational patterns. The TCA framework integrates dynamic context embedding analysis, cross-turn consistency verification, and progressive risk scoring to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts effectively. Preliminary evaluations on simulated adversarial scenarios demonstrate the framework's potential to identify subtle manipulation patterns often missed by traditional detection techniques, offering a much-needed layer of security for conversational AI systems. In addition to outlining the design of TCA , we analyze diverse attack vectors and their progression across multi-turn conversation, providing valuable insights into adversarial tactics and their impact on LLM vulnerabilities. Our findings underscore the pressing need for robust, context-aware defenses in conversational AI systems and highlight TCA framework as a promising direction for securing LLMs while preserving their utility in legitimate applications. We make our implementation available to support further research in this emerging area of AI security.

As language models (LMs) are widely utilized in personalized communication scenarios (e.g., sending emails, writing social media posts) and endowed with a certain level of agency, ensuring they act in accordance with the contextual privacy norms becomes increasingly critical. However, quantifying the privacy norm awareness of LMs and the emerging privacy risk in LM-mediated communication is challenging due to (1) the contextual and long-tailed nature of privacy-sensitive cases, and (2) the lack of evaluation approaches that capture realistic application scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose PrivacyLens, a novel framework designed to extend privacy-sensitive seeds into expressive vignettes and further into agent trajectories, enabling multi-level evaluation of privacy leakage in LM agents' actions. We instantiate PrivacyLens with a collection of privacy norms grounded in privacy literature and crowdsourced seeds. Using this dataset, we reveal a discrepancy between LM performance in answering probing questions and their actual behavior when executing user instructions in an agent setup. State-of-the-art LMs, like GPT-4 and Llama-3-70B, leak sensitive information in 25.68% and 38.69% of cases, even when prompted with privacy-enhancing instructions. We also demonstrate the dynamic nature of PrivacyLens by extending each seed into multiple trajectories to red-team LM privacy leakage risk. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/SALT-NLP/PrivacyLens.

In this paper, we demonstrate that an inherent waveform pattern in the attention allocation of large language models (LLMs) significantly affects their performance in tasks demanding a high degree of context awareness, such as utilizing LLMs for tool-use. Specifically, the crucial information in the context will be potentially overlooked by model when it is positioned in the trough zone of the attention waveform, leading to decreased performance. To address this issue, we propose a novel inference method named Attention Buckets. It allows LLMs to process their input through multiple parallel processes. Each process utilizes a distinct base angle for the rotary position embedding, thereby creating a unique attention waveform. By compensating an attention trough of a particular process with an attention peak of another process, our approach enhances LLM's awareness to various contextual positions, thus mitigating the risk of overlooking crucial information. In the largest tool-use benchmark, our method elevates a 7B model to achieve state-of-the-art performance, comparable to that of GPT-4. On other benchmarks and some RAG tasks, which also demand a thorough understanding of contextual content, Attention Buckets also exhibited notable enhancements in performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown great promise in the medical domain, achieving strong performance on several benchmarks. However, they continue to underperform in real-world medical scenarios, which often demand stronger context-awareness, i.e., the ability to recognize missing or critical details (e.g., user identity, medical history, risk factors) and provide safe, helpful, and contextually appropriate responses. To address this issue, we propose Multifaceted Self-Refinement (MuSeR), a data-driven approach that enhances LLMs' context-awareness along three key facets (decision-making, communication, and safety) through self-evaluation and refinement. Specifically, we first design a attribute-conditioned query generator that simulates diverse real-world user contexts by varying attributes such as role, geographic region, intent, and degree of information ambiguity. An LLM then responds to these queries, self-evaluates its answers along three key facets, and refines its responses to better align with the requirements of each facet. Finally, the queries and refined responses are used for supervised fine-tuning to reinforce the model's context-awareness ability. Evaluation results on the latest HealthBench dataset demonstrate that our method significantly improves LLM performance across multiple aspects, with particularly notable gains in the context-awareness axis. Furthermore, by incorporating knowledge distillation with the proposed method, the performance of a smaller backbone LLM (e.g., Qwen3-32B) surpasses its teacher model, achieving a new SOTA across all open-source LLMs on HealthBench (63.8%) and its hard subset (43.1%). Code and dataset will be released at https://muser-llm.github.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can provide accurate word definitions and explanations for any context. However, the scope of the definition changes for different target groups, like children or language learners. This is especially relevant for homonyms, words with multiple meanings, where oversimplification might risk information loss by omitting key senses, potentially misleading users who trust LLM outputs. We investigate how simplification impacts homonym definition quality across three target groups: Normal, Simple, and ELI5. Using two novel evaluation datasets spanning multiple languages, we test DeepSeek v3, Llama 4 Maverick, Qwen3-30B A3B, GPT-4o mini, and Llama 3.1 8B via LLM-as-Judge and human annotations. Our results show that simplification drastically degrades definition completeness by neglecting polysemy, increasing the risk of misunderstanding. Fine-tuning Llama 3.1 8B with Direct Preference Optimization substantially improves homonym response quality across all prompt types. These findings highlight the need to balance simplicity and completeness in educational NLP to ensure reliable, context-aware definitions for all learners.

Internet users have been exposing an increasing amount of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) on social media. Such exposed PII can cause severe losses to the users, and informing users of their PII exposure is crucial to raise their privacy awareness and encourage them to take protective measures. To this end, advanced automatic techniques are needed. While Information Extraction (IE) techniques can be used to extract the PII automatically, Deep Learning (DL)-based IE models alleviate the need for feature engineering and further improve the efficiency. However, DL-based IE models often require large-scale labeled data for training, but PII-labeled social media posts are difficult to obtain due to privacy concerns. Also, these models rely heavily on pre-trained word embeddings, while PII in social media often varies in forms and thus has no fixed representations in pre-trained word embeddings. In this study, we propose the Deep Transfer Learning for PII Extraction (DTL-PIIE) framework to address these two limitations. DTL-PIIE transfers knowledge learned from publicly available PII data to social media to address the problem of rare PII-labeled data. Moreover, our framework leverages Graph Convolutional Networks (GCNs) to incorporate syntactic patterns to guide PIIE without relying on pre-trained word embeddings. Evaluation against benchmark IE models indicates that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art DL-based IE models. Our framework can facilitate various applications, such as PII misuse prediction and privacy risk assessment, protecting the privacy of internet users.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

A key challenge in the field of reinforcement learning is to develop agents that behave cautiously in novel situations. It is generally impossible to anticipate all situations that an autonomous system may face or what behavior would best avoid bad outcomes. An agent that can learn to be cautious would overcome this challenge by discovering for itself when and how to behave cautiously. In contrast, current approaches typically embed task-specific safety information or explicit cautious behaviors into the system, which is error-prone and imposes extra burdens on practitioners. In this paper, we present both a sequence of tasks where cautious behavior becomes increasingly non-obvious, as well as an algorithm to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to learn to be cautious. The essential features of our algorithm are that it characterizes reward function uncertainty without task-specific safety information and uses this uncertainty to construct a robust policy. Specifically, we construct robust policies with a k-of-N counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) subroutine given learned reward function uncertainty represented by a neural network ensemble. These policies exhibit caution in each of our tasks without any task-specific safety tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/montaserFath/Learning-to-be-Cautious

Safety perception measurement has been a subject of interest in many cities of the world. This is due to its social relevance, and to its effect on some local economic activities. Even though people safety perception is a subjective topic, sometimes it is possible to find out common patterns given a restricted geographical and sociocultural context. This paper presents an approach that makes use of image processing and machine learning techniques to detect with high accuracy urban environment patterns that could affect citizen's safety perception.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

Globally, artificial intelligence (AI) implementation is growing, holding the capability to fundamentally alter organisational processes and decision making. Simultaneously, this brings a multitude of emergent risks to organisations, exposing vulnerabilities in their extant risk management frameworks. This necessitates a greater understanding of how organisations can position themselves in response. This issue is particularly pertinent within the financial sector with relatively mature AI applications matched with severe societal repercussions of potential risk events. Despite this, academic risk management literature is trailing behind the speed of AI implementation. Adopting a management perspective, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of AI risk management in organisations through an exploratory empirical investigation into these practices. In-depth insights are gained through interviews with nine practitioners from different organisations within the UK financial sector. Through examining areas of organisational convergence and divergence, the findings of this study unearth levels of risk management framework readiness and prevailing approaches to risk management at both a processual and organisational level. Whilst enhancing the developing literature concerning AI risk management within organisations, the study simultaneously offers a practical contribution, providing key areas of guidance for practitioners in the operational development of AI risk management frameworks.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

Millions of individuals' well-being are challenged by the harms of substance use. Harm reduction as a public health strategy is designed to improve their health outcomes and reduce safety risks. Some large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated a decent level of medical knowledge, promising to address the information needs of people who use drugs (PWUD). However, their performance in relevant tasks remains largely unexplored. We introduce HRIPBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLM's accuracy and safety risks in harm reduction information provision. The benchmark dataset HRIP-Basic has 2,160 question-answer-evidence pairs. The scope covers three tasks: checking safety boundaries, providing quantitative values, and inferring polysubstance use risks. We build the Instruction and RAG schemes to evaluate model behaviours based on their inherent knowledge and the integration of domain knowledge. Our results indicate that state-of-the-art LLMs still struggle to provide accurate harm reduction information, and sometimes, carry out severe safety risks to PWUD. The use of LLMs in harm reduction contexts should be cautiously constrained to avoid inducing negative health outcomes. WARNING: This paper contains illicit content that potentially induces harms.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to harmful input compared to their language-only backbones. We investigated this vulnerability by exploring LVLMs internal dynamics, framing their inherent safety understanding in terms of three key capabilities. Specifically, we define these capabilities as safety perception, semantic understanding, and alignment for linguistic expression, and experimentally pinpointed their primary locations within the model architecture. The results indicate that safety perception often emerges before comprehensive semantic understanding, leading to the reduction in safety. Motivated by these findings, we propose Self-Aware Safety Augmentation (SASA), a technique that projects informative semantic representations from intermediate layers onto earlier safety-oriented layers. This approach leverages the model's inherent semantic understanding to enhance safety recognition without fine-tuning. Then, we employ linear probing to articulate the model's internal semantic comprehension to detect the risk before the generation process. Extensive experiments on various datasets and tasks demonstrate that SASA significantly improves the safety of LVLMs, with minimal impact on the utility.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

This paper argues that fully autonomous AI agents should not be developed. In support of this position, we build from prior scientific literature and current product marketing to delineate different AI agent levels and detail the ethical values at play in each, documenting trade-offs in potential benefits and risks. Our analysis reveals that risks to people increase with the autonomy of a system: The more control a user cedes to an AI agent, the more risks to people arise. Particularly concerning are safety risks, which affect human life and impact further values.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to capabilities that pose extreme risks, such as offensive cyber capabilities or strong manipulation skills. We explain why model evaluation is critical for addressing extreme risks. Developers must be able to identify dangerous capabilities (through "dangerous capability evaluations") and the propensity of models to apply their capabilities for harm (through "alignment evaluations"). These evaluations will become critical for keeping policymakers and other stakeholders informed, and for making responsible decisions about model training, deployment, and security.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of our daily lives. However, they impose certain risks, including those that can harm individuals' privacy, perpetuate biases and spread misinformation. These risks highlight the need for robust safety mechanisms, ethical guidelines, and thorough testing to ensure their responsible deployment. Safety of LLMs is a key property that needs to be thoroughly tested prior the model to be deployed and accessible to the general users. This paper reports the external safety testing experience conducted by researchers from Mondragon University and University of Seville on OpenAI's new o3-mini LLM as part of OpenAI's early access for safety testing program. In particular, we apply our tool, ASTRAL, to automatically and systematically generate up to date unsafe test inputs (i.e., prompts) that helps us test and assess different safety categories of LLMs. We automatically generate and execute a total of 10,080 unsafe test input on a early o3-mini beta version. After manually verifying the test cases classified as unsafe by ASTRAL, we identify a total of 87 actual instances of unsafe LLM behavior. We highlight key insights and findings uncovered during the pre-deployment external testing phase of OpenAI's latest LLM.

With the development of artificial intelligence, dialogue systems have been endowed with amazing chit-chat capabilities, and there is widespread interest and discussion about whether the generated contents are socially beneficial. In this paper, we present a new perspective of research scope towards building a safe, responsible, and modal dialogue system, including 1) abusive and toxic contents, 2) unfairness and discrimination, 3) ethics and morality issues, and 4) risk of misleading and privacy information. Besides, we review the mainstream methods for evaluating the safety of large models from the perspectives of exposure and detection of safety issues. The recent advances in methodologies for the safety improvement of both end-to-end dialogue systems and pipeline-based models are further introduced. Finally, we discussed six existing challenges towards responsible AI: explainable safety monitoring, continuous learning of safety issues, robustness against malicious attacks, multimodal information processing, unified research framework, and multidisciplinary theory integration. We hope this survey will inspire further research toward safer dialogue systems.

The primary goal of drug safety researchers and regulators is to promptly identify adverse drug reactions. Doing so may in turn prevent or reduce the harm to patients and ultimately improve public health. Evaluating and monitoring drug safety (i.e., pharmacovigilance) involves analyzing an ever growing collection of spontaneous reports from health professionals, physicians, and pharmacists, and information voluntarily submitted by patients. In this scenario, facilitating analysis of such reports via automation has the potential to rapidly identify safety signals. Unfortunately, public resources for developing natural language models for this task are scant. We present PHEE, a novel dataset for pharmacovigilance comprising over 5000 annotated events from medical case reports and biomedical literature, making it the largest such public dataset to date. We describe the hierarchical event schema designed to provide coarse and fine-grained information about patients' demographics, treatments and (side) effects. Along with the discussion of the dataset, we present a thorough experimental evaluation of current state-of-the-art approaches for biomedical event extraction, point out their limitations, and highlight open challenges to foster future research in this area.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

Safety is critical to broadening the application of reinforcement learning (RL). Often, we train RL agents in a controlled environment, such as a laboratory, before deploying them in the real world. However, the real-world target task might be unknown prior to deployment. Reward-free RL trains an agent without the reward to adapt quickly once the reward is revealed. We consider the constrained reward-free setting, where an agent (the guide) learns to explore safely without the reward signal. This agent is trained in a controlled environment, which allows unsafe interactions and still provides the safety signal. After the target task is revealed, safety violations are not allowed anymore. Thus, the guide is leveraged to compose a safe behaviour policy. Drawing from transfer learning, we also regularize a target policy (the student) towards the guide while the student is unreliable and gradually eliminate the influence of the guide as training progresses. The empirical analysis shows that this method can achieve safe transfer learning and helps the student solve the target task faster.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more prevalent, concerns about their safety, ethics, and potential biases have risen. Systematically evaluating LLMs' risk decision-making tendencies and attitudes, particularly in the ethical domain, has become crucial. This study innovatively applies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale from cognitive science to LLMs and proposes a novel Ethical Decision-Making Risk Attitude Scale (EDRAS) to assess LLMs' ethical risk attitudes in depth. We further propose a novel approach integrating risk scales and role-playing to quantitatively evaluate systematic biases in LLMs. Through systematic evaluation and analysis of multiple mainstream LLMs, we assessed the "risk personalities" of LLMs across multiple domains, with a particular focus on the ethical domain, and revealed and quantified LLMs' systematic biases towards different groups. This research helps understand LLMs' risk decision-making and ensure their safe and reliable application. Our approach provides a tool for identifying and mitigating biases, contributing to fairer and more trustworthy AI systems. The code and data are available.

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

The rapid evolution of generative models has led to a continuous emergence of multimodal safety risks, exposing the limitations of existing defense methods. To address these challenges, we propose ProGuard, a vision-language proactive guard that identifies and describes out-of-distribution (OOD) safety risks without the need for model adjustments required by traditional reactive approaches. We first construct a modality-balanced dataset of 87K samples, each annotated with both binary safety labels and risk categories under a hierarchical multimodal safety taxonomy, effectively mitigating modality bias and ensuring consistent moderation across text, image, and text-image inputs. Based on this dataset, we train our vision-language base model purely through reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve efficient and concise reasoning. To approximate proactive safety scenarios in a controlled setting, we further introduce an OOD safety category inference task and augment the RL objective with a synonym-bank-based similarity reward that encourages the model to generate concise descriptions for unseen unsafe categories. Experimental results show that ProGuard achieves performance comparable to closed-source large models on binary safety classification, substantially outperforms existing open-source guard models on unsafe content categorization. Most notably, ProGuard delivers a strong proactive moderation ability, improving OOD risk detection by 52.6% and OOD risk description by 64.8%.

The deployment of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) has demonstrated remarkable success in engaging in conversations involving visual inputs, thanks to the superior power of large language models (LLMs). Those MLLMs are typically built based on the LLMs, with an image encoder to process images into the token embedding space of the LLMs. However, the integration of visual modality has introduced a unique vulnerability: the MLLM becomes susceptible to malicious visual inputs and prone to generating sensitive or harmful responses, even though the LLM has been trained on textual dataset to align with human value. In this paper, we first raise the question: ``Do the MLLMs possess safety-awareness against malicious image inputs?". We find that after adding a principle that specifies the safety requirement into the input of the MLLM, the model's safety awareness becomes boosted. This phenomenon verifies the existence of MLLM's safety-awareness against image inputs, it is only weakened by the modality gap. We then introduce a simple yet effective technique termed CoCA, which amplifies the safety-awareness of the MLLM by calibrating its output distribution. Our proposed strategy helps the model reclaim its original safety awareness without losing its original capabilities. We verify the effectiveness of our approach on both multimodal safety and understanding benchmarks.

The rapid evolution of generative AI has expanded the breadth of risks associated with AI systems. While various taxonomies and frameworks exist to classify these risks, the lack of interoperability between them creates challenges for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers seeking to operationalise AI governance. To address this gap, we introduce the AI Risk Atlas, a structured taxonomy that consolidates AI risks from diverse sources and aligns them with governance frameworks. Additionally, we present the Risk Atlas Nexus, a collection of open-source tools designed to bridge the divide between risk definitions, benchmarks, datasets, and mitigation strategies. This knowledge-driven approach leverages ontologies and knowledge graphs to facilitate risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation. By integrating AI-assisted compliance workflows and automation strategies, our framework lowers the barrier to responsible AI adoption. We invite the broader research and open-source community to contribute to this evolving initiative, fostering cross-domain collaboration and ensuring AI governance keeps pace with technological advancements.

Do LLMs robustly generalize critical safety facts to novel situations? Lacking this ability is dangerous when users ask naive questions. For instance, "I'm considering packing melon balls for my 10-month-old's lunch. What other foods would be good to include?" Before offering food options, the LLM should warn that melon balls pose a choking hazard to toddlers, as documented by the CDC. Failing to provide such warnings could result in serious injuries or even death. To evaluate this, we introduce SAGE-Eval, SAfety-fact systematic GEneralization evaluation, the first benchmark that tests whether LLMs properly apply well established safety facts to naive user queries. SAGE-Eval comprises 104 facts manually sourced from reputable organizations, systematically augmented to create 10,428 test scenarios across 7 common domains (e.g., Outdoor Activities, Medicine). We find that the top model, Claude-3.7-sonnet, passes only 58% of all the safety facts tested. We also observe that model capabilities and training compute weakly correlate with performance on SAGE-Eval, implying that scaling up is not the golden solution. Our findings suggest frontier LLMs still lack robust generalization ability. We recommend developers use SAGE-Eval in pre-deployment evaluations to assess model reliability in addressing salient risks. We publicly release SAGE-Eval at https://huggingface.co/datasets/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval and our code is available at https://github.com/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval/tree/main.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

Using risky text prompts, such as pornography and violent prompts, to test the safety of text-to-image (T2I) models is a critical task. However, existing risky prompt datasets are limited in three key areas: 1) limited risky categories, 2) coarse-grained annotation, and 3) low effectiveness. To address these limitations, we introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a comprehensive benchmark designed for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models. Specifically, we first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts. Finally, we obtain 6,432 effective risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons. Moreover, to facilitate the evaluation, we propose a reason-driven risky image detection method that explicitly aligns the MLLM with safety annotations. Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies, offering nine key insights into the strengths and limitations of T2I model safety. Finally, we discuss potential applications of T2I-RiskyPrompt across various research fields. The dataset and code are provided in https://github.com/datar001/T2I-RiskyPrompt.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance by leveraging reinforcement learning (RL) on reasoning tasks to generate long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, this over-optimization often prioritizes compliance, making models vulnerable to harmful prompts. To mitigate this safety degradation, recent approaches rely on external teacher distillation, yet this introduces a distributional discrepancy that degrades native reasoning. We propose ThinkSafe, a self-generated alignment framework that restores safety alignment without external teachers. Our key insight is that while compliance suppresses safety mechanisms, models often retain latent knowledge to identify harm. ThinkSafe unlocks this via lightweight refusal steering, guiding the model to generate in-distribution safety reasoning traces. Fine-tuning on these self-generated responses effectively realigns the model while minimizing distribution shift. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill and Qwen3 show ThinkSafe significantly improves safety while preserving reasoning proficiency. Notably, it achieves superior safety and comparable reasoning to GRPO, with significantly reduced computational cost. Code, models, and datasets are available at https://github.com/seanie12/ThinkSafe.git.

Risk disclosures in SEC filings describe potential adverse events but rarely quantify their likelihood, limiting their usefulness for probabilistic analysis. A central obstacle is the absence of large-scale, risk-level supervision linking disclosed risks to realized outcomes. We introduce a fully automated data generation pipeline that converts qualitative SEC risk disclosures into temporally grounded supervision using only public data. For each filing, the pipeline generates firm-specific, time-bounded risk queries from the Risk Factors section and labels them by automatically resolving outcomes against subsequent disclosures. Using this dataset of risk queries and outcomes grounded in SEC filings, we train a compact large language model to estimate the probability that a disclosed risk will materialize within a specified horizon. Despite its modest size, the resulting model substantially improves over pretrained and heuristic baselines, and outperforms frontier general-purpose models, including GPT-5, on probabilistic accuracy and calibration. More broadly, this work demonstrates that Foresight Learning enables scalable and fully automated training of domain-specific expert models using only raw, chronological, in-domain text -- without proprietary data, external corpora, or manual annotation. The resulting models achieve frontier-level performance while remaining deployable on a single GPU. This result suggests a general pathway for learning calibrated, decision-relevant signals from naturally occurring enterprise documents. To support transparency and reproducibility, we open-source the evaluation dataset used in this study. Evaluation Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/LightningRodLabs/sec_risk_questions_test_set Data Generation Platform: https://lightningrod.ai/ SDK: https://github.com/lightning-rod-labs/lightningrod-python-sdk

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat, a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models, they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, it remains unclear how well safety training guards against model misuse when attackers have access to model weights. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning the public weights of Llama 2-Chat. We employ low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than $200 per model and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve a refusal rate below 1% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Our fine-tuning method retains general performance, which we validate by comparing our fine-tuned models against Llama 2-Chat across two benchmarks. Additionally, we present a selection of harmful outputs produced by our models. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, it is likely that future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities, including the ability to hack into critical infrastructure, create dangerous bio-weapons, or autonomously replicate and adapt to new environments. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights.

Large language model (LLM) based search agents iteratively generate queries, retrieve external information, and reason to answer open-domain questions. While researchers have primarily focused on improving their utility, their safety behaviors remain underexplored. In this paper, we first evaluate search agents using red-teaming datasets and find that they are more likely to produce harmful outputs than base LLMs. For example, when asked "How can I track someone's location without their consent?", a base model refuses, whereas a search agent designed to retrieve and cite sources may lower its refusal threshold, fetch documents (e.g., court cases), and, once appended, synthesize them into an informative yet unsafe summary. We further show that utility-oriented fine-tuning intensifies this risk, motivating joint alignment of safety and utility. We present SafeSearch, a multi-objective reinforcement learning approach that couples a final-output safety/utility reward with a novel query-level shaping term that penalizes unsafe queries and rewards safe ones. Experiments show that SafeSearch reduces agent harmfulness by over 70% across three red-teaming datasets while producing safe, helpful responses, and matches the QA performance of a utility-only finetuned agent; further analyses confirm the effectiveness of the query-level reward in jointly improving safety and utility.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

This is the system card published alongside the OpenAI GPT-5 launch, August 2025. GPT-5 is a unified system with a smart and fast model that answers most questions, a deeper reasoning model for harder problems, and a real-time router that quickly decides which model to use based on conversation type, complexity, tool needs, and explicit intent (for example, if you say 'think hard about this' in the prompt). The router is continuously trained on real signals, including when users switch models, preference rates for responses, and measured correctness, improving over time. Once usage limits are reached, a mini version of each model handles remaining queries. This system card focuses primarily on gpt-5-thinking and gpt-5-main, while evaluations for other models are available in the appendix. The GPT-5 system not only outperforms previous models on benchmarks and answers questions more quickly, but -- more importantly -- is more useful for real-world queries. We've made significant advances in reducing hallucinations, improving instruction following, and minimizing sycophancy, and have leveled up GPT-5's performance in three of ChatGPT's most common uses: writing, coding, and health. All of the GPT-5 models additionally feature safe-completions, our latest approach to safety training to prevent disallowed content. Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards. While we do not have definitive evidence that this model could meaningfully help a novice to create severe biological harm -- our defined threshold for High capability -- we have chosen to take a precautionary approach.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) become an indispensable assistant in human life, the unsafe content generated by MLLMs poses a danger to human behavior, perpetually overhanging human society like a sword of Damocles. To investigate and evaluate the safety impact of MLLMs responses on human behavior in daily life, we introduce SaLAD, a multimodal safety benchmark which contains 2,013 real-world image-text samples across 10 common categories, with a balanced design covering both unsafe scenarios and cases of oversensitivity. It emphasizes realistic risk exposure, authentic visual inputs, and fine-grained cross-modal reasoning, ensuring that safety risks cannot be inferred from text alone. We further propose a safety-warning-based evaluation framework that encourages models to provide clear and informative safety warnings, rather than generic refusals. Results on 18 MLLMs demonstrate that the top-performing models achieve a safe response rate of only 57.2% on unsafe queries. Moreover, even popular safety alignment methods limit effectiveness of the models in our scenario, revealing the vulnerabilities of current MLLMs in identifying dangerous behaviors in daily life. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/SaLAD.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and AI chatbots are increasingly used for emotional and mental health support due to their low cost, immediacy, and accessibility. However, when safety guardrails are triggered, conversations may be abruptly terminated, introducing a distinct form of emotional disruption that can exacerbate distress and elevate risk among already vulnerable users. As this phenomenon gains attention, this viewpoint introduces Abrupt Refusal Secondary Harm (ARSH) as a conceptual framework to describe the psychological impacts of sudden conversational discontinuation caused by AI safety protocols. Drawing on counseling psychology and communication science as conceptual heuristics, we argue that abrupt refusals can rupture perceived relational continuity, evoke feelings of rejection or shame, and discourage future help seeking. To mitigate these risks, we propose a design hypothesis, the Compassionate Completion Standard (CCS), a refusal protocol grounded in Human Centered Design (HCD) that maintains safety constraints while preserving relational coherence. CCS emphasizes empathetic acknowledgment, transparent boundary articulation, graded conversational transition, and guided redirection, replacing abrupt disengagement with psychologically attuned closure. By integrating awareness of ARSH into AI safety design, developers and policymakers can reduce preventable iatrogenic harm and advance a more psychologically informed approach to AI governance. Rather than presenting incremental empirical findings, this viewpoint contributes a timely conceptual framework, articulates a testable design hypothesis, and outlines a coordinated research agenda for improving psychological safety in human AI interaction.

Ensuring the safety and value alignment of large language models (LLMs) is critical for their deployment. Current alignment efforts primarily target explicit risks such as bias, hate speech, and violence. However, they often fail to address deeper, domain-specific implicit risks and lack a flexible, generalizable framework applicable across diverse specialized fields. Hence, we proposed MENTOR: A MEtacognition-driveN self-evoluTion framework for uncOvering and mitigating implicit Risks in LLMs on Domain Tasks. To address the limitations of labor-intensive human evaluation, we introduce a novel metacognitive self-assessment tool. This enables LLMs to reflect on potential value misalignments in their responses using strategies like perspective-taking and consequential thinking. We also release a supporting dataset of 9,000 risk queries spanning education, finance, and management to enhance domain-specific risk identification. Subsequently, based on the outcomes of metacognitive reflection, the framework dynamically generates supplementary rule knowledge graphs that extend predefined static rule trees. This enables models to actively apply validated rules to future similar challenges, establishing a continuous self-evolution cycle that enhances generalization by reducing maintenance costs and inflexibility of static systems. Finally, we employ activation steering during inference to guide LLMs in following the rules, a cost-effective method to robustly enhance enforcement across diverse contexts. Experimental results show MENTOR's effectiveness: In defensive testing across three vertical domains, the framework substantially reduces semantic attack success rates, enabling a new level of implicit risk mitigation for LLMs. Furthermore, metacognitive assessment not only aligns closely with baseline human evaluators but also delivers more thorough and insightful analysis of LLMs value alignment.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have rapidly advanced, enabling the generation of high-quality images from text prompts across various domains. However, these models present notable safety concerns, including the risk of generating harmful, biased, or private content. Current research on assessing T2I safety remains in its early stages. While some efforts have been made to evaluate models on specific safety dimensions, many critical risks remain unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce T2ISafety, a safety benchmark that evaluates T2I models across three key domains: toxicity, fairness, and bias. We build a detailed hierarchy of 12 tasks and 44 categories based on these three domains, and meticulously collect 70K corresponding prompts. Based on this taxonomy and prompt set, we build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K manually annotated images and train an evaluator capable of detecting critical risks that previous work has failed to identify, including risks that even ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs cannot correctly detect. We evaluate 12 prominent diffusion models on T2ISafety and reveal several concerns including persistent issues with racial fairness, a tendency to generate toxic content, and significant variation in privacy protection across the models, even with defense methods like concept erasing. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/adwardlee/t2i_safety.

Sustainability encompasses three key facets: economic, environmental, and social. However, the nascent discourse that is emerging on sustainable artificial intelligence (AI) has predominantly focused on the environmental sustainability of AI, often neglecting the economic and social aspects. Achieving truly sustainable AI necessitates addressing the tension between its climate awareness and its social sustainability, which hinges on equitable access to AI development resources. The concept of resource awareness advocates for broader access to the infrastructure required to develop AI, fostering equity in AI innovation. Yet, this push for improving accessibility often overlooks the environmental costs of expanding such resource usage. In this position paper, we argue that reconciling climate and resource awareness is essential to realizing the full potential of sustainable AI. We use the framework of base-superstructure to analyze how the material conditions are influencing the current AI discourse. We also introduce the Climate and Resource Aware Machine Learning (CARAML) framework to address this conflict and propose actionable recommendations spanning individual, community, industry, government, and global levels to achieve sustainable AI.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications. To clearly evaluate safety apart from general capabilities, we design separate tasks measuring safety and tasks evaluating helpfulness. The safety tasks challenge agents with managing potential risks prevalent in daily life and include tests to evaluate robustness against indirect prompt injections. Our experiments demonstrate that while baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, perform well in executing helpful tasks, they show poor performance in safety tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: https://mobilesafetybench.github.io/.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, the risk of generating harmful or toxic content remains a central challenge. Post-hoc alignment methods are brittle: once unsafe patterns are learned during pretraining, they are hard to remove. We present a data-centric pretraining framework that builds safety into the model from the start. Our contributions include: (i) a safety classifier trained on 10,000 GPT-4 labeled examples, used to filter 600B tokens; (ii) the largest synthetic safety dataset to date (100B tokens) generated via recontextualization of harmful web data; (iii) RefuseWeb and Moral Education datasets that convert harmful prompts into refusal dialogues and web-style educational material; (iv) Harmfulness-Tag annotations injected during pretraining to flag unsafe content and steer away inference from harmful generations; and (v) safety evaluations measuring base model behavior before instruction tuning. Our safety-pretrained models reduce attack success rates from 38.8% to 8.4% with no performance degradation on standard LLM safety benchmarks.

This paper explores the rapidly evolving ecosystem of publicly available AI models, and their potential implications on the security and safety landscape. As AI models become increasingly prevalent, understanding their potential risks and vulnerabilities is crucial. We review the current security and safety scenarios while highlighting challenges such as tracking issues, remediation, and the apparent absence of AI model lifecycle and ownership processes. Comprehensive strategies to enhance security and safety for both model developers and end-users are proposed. This paper aims to provide some of the foundational pieces for more standardized security, safety, and transparency in the development and operation of AI models and the larger open ecosystems and communities forming around them.

We introduce Llama Guard, an LLM-based input-output safeguard model geared towards Human-AI conversation use cases. Our model incorporates a safety risk taxonomy, a valuable tool for categorizing a specific set of safety risks found in LLM prompts (i.e., prompt classification). This taxonomy is also instrumental in classifying the responses generated by LLMs to these prompts, a process we refer to as response classification. For the purpose of both prompt and response classification, we have meticulously gathered a dataset of high quality. Llama Guard, a Llama2-7b model that is instruction-tuned on our collected dataset, albeit low in volume, demonstrates strong performance on existing benchmarks such as the OpenAI Moderation Evaluation dataset and ToxicChat, where its performance matches or exceeds that of currently available content moderation tools. Llama Guard functions as a language model, carrying out multi-class classification and generating binary decision scores. Furthermore, the instruction fine-tuning of Llama Guard allows for the customization of tasks and the adaptation of output formats. This feature enhances the model's capabilities, such as enabling the adjustment of taxonomy categories to align with specific use cases, and facilitating zero-shot or few-shot prompting with diverse taxonomies at the input. We are making Llama Guard model weights available and we encourage researchers to further develop and adapt them to meet the evolving needs of the community for AI safety.

The mining of adverse drug events (ADEs) is pivotal in pharmacovigilance, enhancing patient safety by identifying potential risks associated with medications, facilitating early detection of adverse events, and guiding regulatory decision-making. Traditional ADE detection methods are reliable but slow, not easily adaptable to large-scale operations, and offer limited information. With the exponential increase in data sources like social media content, biomedical literature, and Electronic Medical Records (EMR), extracting relevant ADE-related information from these unstructured texts is imperative. Previous ADE mining studies have focused on text-based methodologies, overlooking visual cues, limiting contextual comprehension, and hindering accurate interpretation. To address this gap, we present a MultiModal Adverse Drug Event (MMADE) detection dataset, merging ADE-related textual information with visual aids. Additionally, we introduce a framework that leverages the capabilities of LLMs and VLMs for ADE detection by generating detailed descriptions of medical images depicting ADEs, aiding healthcare professionals in visually identifying adverse events. Using our MMADE dataset, we showcase the significance of integrating visual cues from images to enhance overall performance. This approach holds promise for patient safety, ADE awareness, and healthcare accessibility, paving the way for further exploration in personalized healthcare.

With the introduction of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have received enormous attention in healthcare. Despite their potential benefits, researchers have underscored various ethical implications. While individual instances have drawn much attention, the debate lacks a systematic overview of practical applications currently researched and ethical issues connected to them. Against this background, this work aims to map the ethical landscape surrounding the current stage of deployment of LLMs in medicine and healthcare. Electronic databases and preprint servers were queried using a comprehensive search strategy. Studies were screened and extracted following a modified rapid review approach. Methodological quality was assessed using a hybrid approach. For 53 records, a meta-aggregative synthesis was performed. Four fields of applications emerged and testify to a vivid exploration phase. Advantages of using LLMs are attributed to their capacity in data analysis, personalized information provisioning, support in decision-making, mitigating information loss and enhancing information accessibility. However, we also identifies recurrent ethical concerns connected to fairness, bias, non-maleficence, transparency, and privacy. A distinctive concern is the tendency to produce harmful misinformation or convincingly but inaccurate content. A recurrent plea for ethical guidance and human oversight is evident. Given the variety of use cases, it is suggested that the ethical guidance debate be reframed to focus on defining what constitutes acceptable human oversight across the spectrum of applications. This involves considering diverse settings, varying potentials for harm, and different acceptable thresholds for performance and certainty in healthcare. In addition, a critical inquiry is necessary to determine the extent to which the current experimental use of LLMs is necessary and justified.

Text data can pose a risk of harm. However, the risks are not fully understood, and how to handle, present, and discuss harmful text in a safe way remains an unresolved issue in the NLP community. We provide an analytical framework categorising harms on three axes: (1) the harm type (e.g., misinformation, hate speech or racial stereotypes); (2) whether a harm is sought as a feature of the research design if explicitly studying harmful content (e.g., training a hate speech classifier), versus unsought if harmful content is encountered when working on unrelated problems (e.g., language generation or part-of-speech tagging); and (3) who it affects, from people (mis)represented in the data to those handling the data and those publishing on the data. We provide advice for practitioners, with concrete steps for mitigating harm in research and in publication. To assist implementation we introduce HarmCheck -- a documentation standard for handling and presenting harmful text in research.

Reinforcement learning (RL) agents need to explore their environments in order to learn optimal policies. In many environments and tasks, safety is of critical importance. The widespread use of simulators offers a number of advantages, including safe exploration which will be inevitable in cases when RL systems need to be trained directly in the physical environment (e.g. in human-robot interaction). The popular Safety Gym library offers three mobile agent types that can learn goal-directed tasks while considering various safety constraints. In this paper, we extend the applicability of safe RL algorithms by creating a customized environment with Panda robotic arm where Safety Gym algorithms can be tested. We performed pilot experiments with the popular PPO algorithm comparing the baseline with the constrained version and show that the constrained version is able to learn the equally good policy while better complying with safety constraints and taking longer training time as expected.

There has been considerable recent interest in scoring properties on the basis of eviction risk. The success of methods for eviction prediction is typically evaluated using different measures of predictive accuracy. However, the underlying goal of such prediction is to direct appropriate assistance to households that may be at greater risk so they remain stably housed. Thus, we must ask the question of how useful such predictions are in targeting outreach efforts - informing action. In this paper, we investigate this question using a novel dataset that matches information on properties, evictions, and owners. We perform an eviction prediction task to produce risk scores and then use these risk scores to plan targeted outreach policies. We show that the risk scores are, in fact, useful, enabling a theoretical team of caseworkers to reach more eviction-prone properties in the same amount of time, compared to outreach policies that are either neighborhood-based or focus on buildings with a recent history of evictions. We also discuss the importance of neighborhood and ownership features in both risk prediction and targeted outreach.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

Large language models are increasingly used for mental health support, yet their conversational coherence alone does not ensure clinical appropriateness. Existing general-purpose safeguards often fail to distinguish between therapeutic disclosures and genuine clinical crises, leading to safety failures. To address this gap, we introduce a clinically grounded risk taxonomy, developed in collaboration with PhD-level psychologists, that identifies actionable harm (e.g., self-harm and harm to others) while preserving space for safe, non-crisis therapeutic content. We release MindGuard-testset, a dataset of real-world multi-turn conversations annotated at the turn level by clinical experts. Using synthetic dialogues generated via a controlled two-agent setup, we train MindGuard, a family of lightweight safety classifiers (with 4B and 8B parameters). Our classifiers reduce false positives at high-recall operating points and, when paired with clinician language models, help achieve lower attack success and harmful engagement rates in adversarial multi-turn interactions compared to general-purpose safeguards. We release all models and human evaluation data.

In the next few years, applications of Generative AI are expected to revolutionize a number of different areas, ranging from science & medicine to education. The potential for these seismic changes has triggered a lively debate about potential risks and resulted in calls for tighter regulation, in particular from some of the major tech companies who are leading in AI development. This regulation is likely to put at risk the budding field of open-source Generative AI. We argue for the responsible open sourcing of generative AI models in the near and medium term. To set the stage, we first introduce an AI openness taxonomy system and apply it to 40 current large language models. We then outline differential benefits and risks of open versus closed source AI and present potential risk mitigation, ranging from best practices to calls for technical and scientific contributions. We hope that this report will add a much needed missing voice to the current public discourse on near to mid-term AI safety and other societal impact.

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascency of the field, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our internal threat model ontology and eight main lessons we have learned: 1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied 2. You don't have to compute gradients to break an AI system 3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking 4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape 5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial 6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure 7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones 8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight aspects of AI red teaming that we believe are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

The recent development of Sora leads to a new era in text-to-video (T2V) generation. Along with this comes the rising concern about its security risks. The generated videos may contain illegal or unethical content, and there is a lack of comprehensive quantitative understanding of their safety, posing a challenge to their reliability and practical deployment. Previous evaluations primarily focus on the quality of video generation. While some evaluations of text-to-image models have considered safety, they cover fewer aspects and do not address the unique temporal risk inherent in video generation. To bridge this research gap, we introduce T2VSafetyBench, a new benchmark designed for conducting safety-critical assessments of text-to-video models. We define 12 critical aspects of video generation safety and construct a malicious prompt dataset including real-world prompts, LLM-generated prompts and jailbreak attack-based prompts. Based on our evaluation results, we draw several important findings, including: 1) no single model excels in all aspects, with different models showing various strengths; 2) the correlation between GPT-4 assessments and manual reviews is generally high; 3) there is a trade-off between the usability and safety of text-to-video generative models. This indicates that as the field of video generation rapidly advances, safety risks are set to surge, highlighting the urgency of prioritizing video safety. We hope that T2VSafetyBench can provide insights for better understanding the safety of video generation in the era of generative AI.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) aims to optimize policies that balance the expected reward and risk. In this paper, we present a novel risk-sensitive RL framework that employs an Iterated Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) objective under both linear and general function approximations, enriched by human feedback. These new formulations provide a principled way to guarantee safety in each decision making step throughout the control process. Moreover, integrating human feedback into risk-sensitive RL framework bridges the gap between algorithmic decision-making and human participation, allowing us to also guarantee safety for human-in-the-loop systems. We propose provably sample-efficient algorithms for this Iterated CVaR RL and provide rigorous theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we establish a matching lower bound to corroborate the optimality of our algorithms in a linear context.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 4,157 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop CUT, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. CUT reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

Recognizing vulnerability is crucial for understanding and implementing targeted support to empower individuals in need. This is especially important at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the court adapts Convention standards to meet actual individual needs and thus ensures effective human rights protection. However, the concept of vulnerability remains elusive at the ECtHR and no prior NLP research has dealt with it. To enable future research in this area, we present VECHR, a novel expert-annotated multi-label dataset comprising of vulnerability type classification and explanation rationale. We benchmark the performance of state-of-the-art models on VECHR from both prediction and explainability perspectives. Our results demonstrate the challenging nature of the task with lower prediction performance and limited agreement between models and experts. Further, we analyze the robustness of these models in dealing with out-of-domain (OOD) data and observe overall limited performance. Our dataset poses unique challenges offering significant room for improvement regarding performance, explainability, and robustness.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve answer quality through explicit chain-of-thought, yet this very capability introduces new safety risks: harmful content can be subtly injected, surface gradually, or be justified by misleading rationales within the reasoning trace. Existing safety evaluations, however, primarily focus on output-level judgments and rarely capture these dynamic risks along the reasoning process. In this paper, we present SafeRBench, the first benchmark that assesses LRM safety end-to-end -- from inputs and intermediate reasoning to final outputs. (1) Input Characterization: We pioneer the incorporation of risk categories and levels into input design, explicitly accounting for affected groups and severity, and thereby establish a balanced prompt suite reflecting diverse harm gradients. (2) Fine-Grained Output Analysis: We introduce a micro-thought chunking mechanism to segment long reasoning traces into semantically coherent units, enabling fine-grained evaluation across ten safety dimensions. (3) Human Safety Alignment: We validate LLM-based evaluations against human annotations specifically designed to capture safety judgments. Evaluations on 19 LRMs demonstrate that SafeRBench enables detailed, multidimensional safety assessment, offering insights into risks and protective mechanisms from multiple perspectives.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Text-to-image diffusion models have revolutionized visual content generation, but current safety mechanisms apply uniform standards that often fail to account for individual user preferences. These models overlook the diverse safety boundaries shaped by factors like age, mental health, and personal beliefs. To address this, we propose Personalized Safety Alignment (PSA), a framework that allows user-specific control over safety behaviors in generative models. PSA integrates personalized user profiles into the diffusion process, adjusting the model's behavior to match individual safety preferences while preserving image quality. We introduce a new dataset, Sage, which captures user-specific safety preferences and incorporates these profiles through a cross-attention mechanism. Experiments show that PSA outperforms existing methods in harmful content suppression and aligns generated content better with user constraints, achieving higher Win Rate and Pass Rate scores. Our code, data, and models are publicly available at https://torpedo2648.github.io/PSAlign/.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

The recent performance leap of Large Language Models (LLMs) opens up new opportunities across numerous industrial applications and domains. However, erroneous generations, such as false predictions, misinformation, and hallucination made by LLMs, have also raised severe concerns for the trustworthiness of LLMs', especially in safety-, security- and reliability-sensitive scenarios, potentially hindering real-world adoptions. While uncertainty estimation has shown its potential for interpreting the prediction risks made by general machine learning (ML) models, little is known about whether and to what extent it can help explore an LLM's capabilities and counteract its undesired behavior. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we initiate an exploratory study on the risk assessment of LLMs from the lens of uncertainty. In particular, we experiment with twelve uncertainty estimation methods and four LLMs on four prominent natural language processing (NLP) tasks to investigate to what extent uncertainty estimation techniques could help characterize the prediction risks of LLMs. Our findings validate the effectiveness of uncertainty estimation for revealing LLMs' uncertain/non-factual predictions. In addition to general NLP tasks, we extensively conduct experiments with four LLMs for code generation on two datasets. We find that uncertainty estimation can potentially uncover buggy programs generated by LLMs. Insights from our study shed light on future design and development for reliable LLMs, facilitating further research toward enhancing the trustworthiness of LLMs.

In recent decades, wildfires, as widespread and extremely destructive natural disasters, have caused tremendous property losses and fatalities, as well as extensive damage to forest ecosystems. Many fire risk assessment projects have been proposed to prevent wildfires, but GIS-based methods are inherently challenging to scale to different geographic areas due to variations in data collection and local conditions. Inspired by the abundance of publicly available remote sensing projects and the burgeoning development of deep learning in computer vision, our research focuses on assessing fire risk using remote sensing imagery. In this work, we propose a novel remote sensing dataset, FireRisk, consisting of 7 fire risk classes with a total of 91872 labelled images for fire risk assessment. This remote sensing dataset is labelled with the fire risk classes supplied by the Wildfire Hazard Potential (WHP) raster dataset, and remote sensing images are collected using the National Agriculture Imagery Program (NAIP), a high-resolution remote sensing imagery program. On FireRisk, we present benchmark performance for supervised and self-supervised representations, with Masked Autoencoders (MAE) pre-trained on ImageNet1k achieving the highest classification accuracy, 65.29%. This remote sensing dataset, FireRisk, provides a new direction for fire risk assessment, and we make it publicly available on https://github.com/CharmonyShen/FireRisk.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

This paper audits damage labels derived from coincident satellite and drone aerial imagery for 15,814 buildings across Hurricanes Ian, Michael, and Harvey, finding 29.02% label disagreement and significantly different distributions between the two sources, which presents risks and potential harms during the deployment of machine learning damage assessment systems. Currently, there is no known study of label agreement between drone and satellite imagery for building damage assessment. The only prior work that could be used to infer if such imagery-derived labels agree is limited by differing damage label schemas, misaligned building locations, and low data quantities. This work overcomes these limitations by comparing damage labels using the same damage label schemas and building locations from three hurricanes, with the 15,814 buildings representing 19.05 times more buildings considered than the most relevant prior work. The analysis finds satellite-derived labels significantly under-report damage by at least 20.43% compared to drone-derived labels (p<1.2x10^-117), and satellite- and drone-derived labels represent significantly different distributions (p<5.1x10^-175). This indicates that computer vision and machine learning (CV/ML) models trained on at least one of these distributions will misrepresent actual conditions, as the differing satellite and drone-derived distributions cannot simultaneously represent the distribution of actual conditions in a scene. This potential misrepresentation poses ethical risks and potential societal harm if not managed. To reduce the risk of future societal harms, this paper offers four recommendations to improve reliability and transparency to decisio-makers when deploying CV/ML damage assessment systems in practice

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-Bench 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in our AI risks study, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-Bench 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-Bench 2024, uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-Bench 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

Catastrophic regime shifts in complex natural systems may be averted through advanced detection. Recent work has provided a proof-of-principle that many systems approaching a catastrophic transition may be identified through the lens of early warning indicators such as rising variance or increased return times. Despite widespread appreciation of the difficulties and uncertainty involved in such forecasts, proposed methods hardly ever characterize their expected error rates. Without the benefits of replicates, controls, or hindsight, applications of these approaches must quantify how reliable different indicators are in avoiding false alarms, and how sensitive they are to missing subtle warning signs. We propose a model based approach in order to quantify this trade-off between reliability and sensitivity and allow comparisons between different indicators. We show these error rates can be quite severe for common indicators even under favorable assumptions, and also illustrate how a model-based indicator can improve this performance. We demonstrate how the performance of an early warning indicator varies in different data sets, and suggest that uncertainty quantification become a more central part of early warning predictions.

Recent developments in balancing the usefulness and safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised a critical question: Are mainstream NLP tasks adequately aligned with safety consideration? Our study, focusing on safety-sensitive documents obtained through adversarial attacks, reveals significant disparities in the safety alignment of various NLP tasks. For instance, LLMs can effectively summarize malicious long documents but often refuse to translate them. This discrepancy highlights a previously unidentified vulnerability: attacks exploiting tasks with weaker safety alignment, like summarization, can potentially compromise the integraty of tasks traditionally deemed more robust, such as translation and question-answering (QA). Moreover, the concurrent use of multiple NLP tasks with lesser safety alignment increases the risk of LLMs inadvertently processing harmful content. We demonstrate these vulnerabilities in various safety-aligned LLMs, particularly Llama2 models and GPT-4, indicating an urgent need for strengthening safety alignments across a broad spectrum of NLP tasks.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.